We present a game semantics for intuitionistic type theory. Specifically, we propose categories with families of a new variant of games and strategies for both extensional and intensional variants of the type theory with -, -, and Id-types as well as universes. Our games and strategies generalize the existing notion of games and strategies and achieve an interpretation of dependent types and the hierarchy of universes in an intuitive manner. We believe that it is a significant step towards a computational and intensional interpretation of the type theory.
Introduction
In the present paper, we propose a new game semantics for intuitionistic type theory. Our motivation is to provide a computational and intensional interpretation of the type theory for its mathematical (or semantic) justification and investigation.
Intuitionistic type theory (or Martin-Löf type theory) is an extension of the simply-typed λ-calculus that, under the Curry-Howard isomorphism, corresponds to intuitionistic predicate logic, in which types can depend on terms. Thus, it is a functional programming language as well as a formal logical system. It was proposed by Martin-Löf [ML82, ML84, ML98, RS84] as a foundation of constructive mathematics. Since then, several dependent type theories 1 such as Calculus of Construction [CH88] were also proposed. Some of these type theories were implemented as proof assistants such as Nuprl [CAB + 86], Coq [T + 12], and Agda [Nor07] . Based on a homotopy-theoretic interpretation, an extension of intuitionistic type theory, called homotopy type theory (HoTT) , was recently proposed, providing new insights and having potential to be a powerful and practical foundation of mathematics [Uni13] . However, a computational interpretation of univalence axiom (UA) and higher inductive types (HIT), the core axiom and construction of HoTT, has been missing, though a significant step towards this goal was recently taken in [BCH14] .
Game semantics refers to a particular kind of semantics of logics and programming languages in which types and terms are interpreted as "games" and "strategies", respectively. Historically, game semantics gave the first syntax-independent characterization of the language PCF [AJM00, HO00, Nic94]; since then, a variety of games and strategies have been proposed to characterize various programming features [McC98, HY97, Lai97, AM97, AHM98, MT11, AM98]. One of its distinguishing features is to interpret syntax as dynamic interactions between two players 2 , providing a computational explanation of proofs and programs in an intuitive manner. Remarkably, game semantics for dependent type theory was not addressed until Abramsky et al. recently constructed such a model in [AJV15] . However, it does not interpret universes, an important component of intuitionistic type theory.
In the present paper, we propose a new game semantics for intuitionistic type theory. Concretely, we first propose a category with families (CwF) EPG of a new variant of games and strategies that supports -, -, and Id-types as well as universes, which induces an interpretation of the extensional variant of intuitionistic type theory (ETT). And based on EPG, we construct another CwF IPG to interpret the intensional variant (ITT).
Our game-theoretic models have an advantage over categorical models such as [?, ?, Dyb96] in their concreteness and over set-theoretic models in their intensionality 3 . Also, our models may have advantages over realizability models [?, ?] : Models that take (codes of) Turing machines as realizers are "too intensional" 4 (to interpret functional languages), but game-theoretic models in general have an appropriate degree of intensionality as various definability (and full abstraction) results in the literature have demonstrated; approaches that take logical calculi as realizers are syntactic models, but games and strategies are different from programming languages (syntax), providing new insights and tools to analyze the type theory. When compared to the game semantics in [AJV15] , our model in IPG is simpler and provides a more intuitive interpretation. Moreover, it interprets the hierarchy of universes. Furthermore, since strategies can be seen as algorithms, our interpretation is conceptually closer to the BHK-interpretation of intuitionistic logic, on which Martin-Löf type theory is based, than the homotopy-theoretic interpretation. On the other hand, our model in IPG admits the axiom UIP and refutes the univalence axiom. Thus, it is a future work to refine the model to capture the phenomena in HoTT. Also, it remains to establish a definability result.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We first present some preliminary notions in Section 2, and then formulate new games and strategies for an interpretation of the type theory in Section 3, introducing particular games to interpret universes in Section 3.5. Next, defining the category of the games and strategies in Section 4, we construct a model of ETT in Section 5, in which specific types such as -, , Id-types as well as universes are interpreted. Based on the extensional model, we then present a model of ITT in Section 6 and analyze its property in Section7. Finally, we make a conclusion and propose some future works in Section 8.
◮ Remark. Because we shall present a model of the type theory by constructing an instance of a CwF, and its interpretation of the type theory is well-known (see [Dyb96, Hof97] ), we will not review the syntax of the type theory. For references of the syntax, see [Hof97, NPS90] .
Preliminaries
In this preliminary section, we fix notation and quickly review the variant of games and strategies defined in [McC98] .
◮ Notation. We shall use the following notations throughout the present paper.
◮ We use bold letters s, t, u, v, w, etc. to denote sequences.
◮ We use letters a, b, c, d, e, m, n, p, q, x, y, z, etc. to denote elements of sequences.
◮ A concatenation of sequences is represented by a juxtaposition of them.
◮ We usually write as, tb, ucv for sequences (a)s, t(b), u(c)v, respectively.
◮ For readability, we sometimes write s.t for the concatenation st of sequences s and t.
◮ We write even(s) and odd(t) to mean that sequences s and t are of even-length and oddlength, respectively.
◮ For a set S of sequences, we define S even df.
= {s ∈ S |even(s)}, S odd df.
= {t ∈ S |odd(t)}.
◮ We write s t (resp. s ≺ t) if s is a (resp. strict) prefix of a sequence t.
◮ We write s ⊑ t (resp. s ⊏ t) if s is a (resp. strict) subsequence of a sequence t.
◮ For a set S of sequences, pref(S) denotes the set of prefixes of sequences in S.
◮ For a partially ordered set P and a subset S ⊆ P , we write sup(S) and inf(S) for the supremum and infimum of S, respectively.
◮ We write N and Z for the set of natural numbers and the set of integers, respectively. Moreover, for each n ∈ Z, we write Z n for the set of integers n.
◮ Given a sequence s and a set X, we write s ↾ X for the subsequence of s which consists of elements in X. In practice, we often have s ∈ Z * with Z = X + Y for some set Y ; in such a case, we abuse the notation: The operation deletes the "tags" for the disjoint union, so that we have s ↾ X ∈ X * .
◮ For a function f : A → B and a subset S ⊆ A, we define f ↾ S : S → B to be the restriction of f to S.
◮ For a pair of sets A, B, we write B A for the set of functions from A to B.
◮ We write A ∼ = B if there is an isomorphism f : A ∼ = → B between objects A and B in a category C.
◮ Let X be a set, and ∼ an equivalence relation on X. For a function f : X → Y , a relation R ⊆ X × X, and a set S ⊆ X * of finite sequences of elements in X, we define:
⇔ (x 1 , x 2 ) ∈ R if (x 1 , x 2 ) ∈ R ⇔ (x 
Games and Strategies
Our variant of games and strategies will be based on the existing ones, specifically the ones defined in [McC98] , which we call MC-games and innocent strategies. We select this variant because it is relatively less restrictive, which is important to interpret various constructions in intuitionistic type theory, e.g., if strategies are restricted to history-free ones as in [AJM00] , then we cannot interpret sum types, as explained in [McC98] . Also, MC-games in some sense combine good points of the two best-known variants, AJM-games [AJM00] and HO-games [HO00] .
In this section, we quickly review the relevant parts of MC-games and innocent strategies, which from now on we call games and strategies.
Arenas
Games are based on a preliminary notion, called arenas.
◮ Definition 2.1.1 (Arenas [McC98] ). An arena is a triple G = (M G , λ G , ⊢ G ), where:
◮ M G is a set, whose elements are called moves.
◮ λ G is a function from M G to {O, P} × {Q, A}, where O, P, Q, A are some distinguished symbols, called the labeling function.
where ⋆ is an arbitrary element, called the enabling relation, which satisfies the following conditions:
in which we used the following notations:
Justified Sequences
Given an arena, we are interested in certain finite sequences of the moves, called justified sequences.
Views, Legal Positions, and Threads
We proceed to define the remaining preliminary definitions: views, legal positions, and threads. ◮ Definition 2.1.3 (Views [HO00, McC98] ). Given a justified sequence s in an arena G, we define the Player view (or the P-view for short) ⌈s⌉ G and the Opponent view (or the O-view for short) ⌊s⌋ G by induction on the length of s as follows:
= ⌊s⌋ G .mn, if n is a P-move with J smtn (n) = m. ◭ Conceptually, views are "currently relevant" parts of previous moves; see [HO00, McC98] for the details.
In [McC98] , an arena specifies the basic rules of a game in terms of certain justified sequences, called legal positions, in the sense that every "play" of the game must be a legal position (but the converse does not necessarily hold).
◮ Definition 2.1.4 (Legal positions [McC98]).
A legal position in an arena G is a sequence s ∈ M * G that satisfies the following conditions: ◮ Justification. s is a justified sequence in G.
◮ Bracketing. If tqua s, where the question q is "answered" by the answer a (i.e., q justifies a), then there is no "unanswered" question in u.
◮ Visibility. If s is of the form s = tmu with m non-initial, then:
The set of all legal positions of an arena G is denoted by L G . ◭ Let us pause here and explain the idea that "an arena specifies the basic rules of a game in terms of legal positions": ◮ The axiom (E3) mentions that an O-move must be justified by a P-move and vice versa.
◮ Then in terms of legal positions, an arena specifies the basic rules of a game: In a play of the game (see Definition 2.1.6), Opponent always makes the first move, and then Player and Opponent alternatively play (alternation), in which every non-initial move must be made for a previous move (justification).
◮ Moreover, we require that an answer must be made for the most recent unanswered question (bracketing).
◮ Finally, visibility condition states that the justifier of each non-initial move must belong to the "relevant part" of the previous moves.
Next, we define the notion of threads. In a legal position, there may be several initial moves; the legal position consists of chains of justifiers initiated by such initial moves. These chains form threads. Formally, ◮ Definition 2.1.5 (Hereditarily justified moves and threads [McC98] ). Let G be an arena, and s ∈ L G . Assume that m is an occurrence of a move in s. The chain of justifiers from m is a maximal sequence x 0 x 1 . . . x k m of justifiers from m, i.e., moves x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x k , m of G that satisfy
where x 0 is initial. In this case, we say that m is hereditarily justified by the occurrence x 0 of an initial move. Moreover, the subsequence of s consisting of the chains of justifiers that end with x 0 is called the thread of x 0 in s. ◭ ◮ Convention. An occurrence of an initial move is often called an initial occurrence.
◮ Notation. We introduce a convenient notation:
◮ We write s ↾ n, where s is a legal position of an arena and n is an initial occurrence in s, for the thread of n in s.
◮ More generally, we write s ↾ I, where s is a legal position of an arena and I is a set of initial occurrences in s, for the subsequence of s consisting of threads of initial occurrences in I.
Games
We are now ready to define the notion of games.
forms an arena (also denoted by G).
◮ P G is a subset of L G , whose elements are called the valid positions (or plays) of G, that satisfies:
⊲ (V1) P G is non-empty and prefix-closed. ⊲ (V2) If s ∈ P G and I is a set of initial occurrences in s, then s ↾ I ∈ P G . ◭
The axiom (V1) talks about the natural phenomenon that each non-empty play must have the previous play, while the axiom (V2) corresponds to the idea that a play consists of several plays that are independently developed.
Note that it is possible to have a game G such that there is some move m ∈ M G that does not occur in any play, or some enabled pair m ⊢ G n is not used for a justification in a play. For technical convenience, we would like to prohibit such unused structures; in other words, we shall focus on economical games: ◮ Definition 2.1.7 (Economical games). A game G is said to be economical if every move m ∈ M G appears in a valid position of G, and every enabled pair x ⊢ G y occurs as a non-initial move y and its justifier x in a valid position of G. ◭ Clearly, we will not lose any important generality with the following convention:
◮ Convention. From now on, we exclusively focus on economical games, and the term "games" refers to economical games by default. 5 We will assume that games are always well-opened:
◮ Definition 2.1.8 (Well-opened games [AJM00, McC98] ). A game G is said to be well-opened if sm ∈ P G with m initial implies s = ǫ. ◭ That is, a well-opened game is a game in which each play has at most one initial move. Next, we introduce the notion of subgames, a sort of a "substructure-relation" such as subgroups, subcategories, etc.
◮ Definition 2.1.9 (Subgames). A subgame of a game G is a game H that satisfies:
In this case, we write H G. ◭
We further define a stronger notion of subgames, whose motivation will be clarified shortly.
◮ Definition 2.1.10 (Total subgames). A subgame H of a game G is said to be a total subgame of G and written H tot G if every play s ∈ P H that is maximal in P H (with respect to the partial order of prefix relation on P H ) is also maximal in P G . ◭
Constructions on Games
Here, we quickly review the existing constructions on games. Again, our standard reference is [McC98] . We begin with the tensor product of games. Conceptually, the tensor product A ⊗ B is the game in which the component games A and B are played "in parallel without communication". ◮ Definition 2.1.11 (Tensor product [AJ94, McC98] ). Given games A and B, we define their tensor product A ⊗ B as follows:
Of course, all constructions on games in this paper preserve this property.
Next, we consider linear implication.
◮ Definition 2.1.12 (Linear implication [AJ94, McC98] ). Given games A and B, we define their linear implication A ⊸ B as follows:
For any game G, we shall not distinguish the linear implication I ⊸ G and G, where I = (∅, ∅, ∅, {ǫ}) is the empty game.
The construction of products is the categorical product in the cartesian closed category of MC-games and innocent strategies (see [McC98] ).
◮ Definition 2.1.13 (Product [HO00, McC98] ). Given games A and B, we define their product A&B as follows:
Like AJM-and MC-games [AJM00, McC98] , the construction of exponential will be crucial when we equip our category of games and strategies with a cartesian closed structure.
◮ Definition 2.1.14 (Exponential [HO00, McC98] ). For any game A, we define its exponential !A as follows:
Notationally, exponential precedes any other operation; also, tensor product and product both precede linear implication. E.g., !A ⊸ B means (!A) ⊸ B, and A⊗!B ⊸ !C&D means (A ⊗ (!B)) ⊸ ((!C)&D), etc.
Strategies
We proceed to define strategies. Roughly, a strategy is what tells Player which move she should make next.
◮ Definition 2.1.15 (Strategies [AJ94, AJM00, HO00, McC98]). A strategy σ on a game G is a set of even-length valid positions of G, satisfying the following conditions:
◮ (S1) It is non-empty and "even-prefix-closed": smn ∈ σ ⇒ s ∈ σ.
We write σ : G to indicate that σ is a well-defined strategy on the game G. ◭ ◮ Convention. From now on, we shall abbreviate the condition n = n ′ ∧ J smn (n) = J smn ′ (n ′ ) as n = n ′ (i.e., the equality of justifiers will be implicit).
In general, a strategy can be "partial" in the sense that it may not have any response at some odd-length valid position. Thus, it makes sense to define: 
◭
Because we are interested in total type theory, i.e., a type theory in which every computation terminates, we need to focus on total strategies to establish a definability result. However, we are aiming to obtain a soundness (not necessarily completeness) result in the present paper, we shall address this problem as a future work, and we will not consider total strategies in depth in this paper.
A strategy σ : G, where G is well-opened, can be seen as a particular subgame of G. To establish this fact rigorously, we need the following definition:
◮ Definition 2.1.17 (Strategies as trees). Let σ be a strategy on a game G. We define:
and call it the tree-form of σ with respect to G. ◭
We often omit the subscript G and just write σ when the underlying game G is obvious. Clearly, we may recover σ from σ by removing all the odd-length plays. Thus, σ and σ are essentially the same (in the context of G), just in different forms.
Note in particular that σ is a non-empty, prefix-closed subset of P G . We may in fact characterize strategies on a game G as follows:
◮ Lemma 2.1.18 (Strategies in second-form). For any game G, there is a one-to-one correspondence between strategies σ : G and subsets S ⊆ P G that is:
◮ (tree) Non-empty and prefix-closed (i.e., sm ∈ S ⇒ s ∈ S). ◮ (edet) Deterministic on even-length positions (i.e., smn, smn
◮ (oinc) Inclusive on odd-length positions (i.e., s ∈ S even ∧ sm ∈ P G ⇒ sm ∈ S).
Proof. First, it is straightforward to see that, for each strategy σ : G, the subset σ ⊆ P G satisfies the three conditions of the lemma; e.g., σ is non-empty because ǫ ∈ σ, and it is prefix-closed: For any sm ∈ σ, if s ∈ σ, then s ∈ σ; otherwise, i.e., sm ∈ σ, we may write s = tn ∈ P G for some t ∈ σ, n ∈ M G , whence s ∈ σ.
For the converse, assume that a subset S ⊆ P G satisfies the three conditions. We then have S even : G because:
◮ S even is non-empty as ǫ ∈ S even , and it is even-prefix-closed: If smn ∈ S even , then smn ∈ S, whence s ∈ S and so s ∈ S even because S is prefix-closed.
◮ S even is deterministic: If smn, smn ′ ∈ S even , then n = n ′ by the determinacy on even-length positions of S.
Finally, we show that these constructions are mutually inverses. Clearly (σ) even = σ for all σ : G. It remains to establish the equation S even = S for all S ⊆ P G satisfying the three conditions. Let S ⊆ P G be such a subset. It is immediate that s ∈ S even iff s ∈ S for any even-length play s ∈ P even G . If tm ∈ S even is of odd-length, then t ∈ S even and tm ∈ P G , so we have tm ∈ S as S is inclusive on odd-length positions. Conversely, if un ∈ S is of odd-length, then u ∈ S even and un ∈ P G , whence un ∈ S even .
Thanks to the lemma, we employ:
◮ Convention. From now on, we identify strategies on a game G with subsets of P G that are non-empty, prefix-closed, deterministic on even-length positions, and inclusive on odd-length positions.
Now we establish:
◮ Lemma 2.1.19 (Strategies as subgames). For any (resp. total) strategy σ on a well-opened game G, the structure (M σ , λ σ , ⊢ σ , σ) is a (resp. total) subgame of G, where M σ ⊆ M G is the set of moves of
Proof. We only show that σ satisfies the axioms (V1) and (V2) because it is easy to verify the conditions on the other components. We have shown (V1) in the proof of Lemma 2.1.18. And (V2) is trivially satisfied because G is well-opened. Finally, it is easy to check the additional condition of total strategies.
◮ Convention. In the rest of the paper, strategies σ : G are often identified with the subgames (M σ , λ σ , ⊢ σ , σ) G established above, and abusing the notation we write σ for such subgames. In this sense, the relation σ : G is a particular kind of the subgame relation σ G.
Constructions on Strategies
Next, we review the existing constructions on strategies in [McC98] that are rather standard in the literature of game semantics. One of the most basic strategies is the so-called copy-cat strategies, which basically "copy and paste" the last O-moves.
◮ Definition 2.1.20 (Copy-cat strategies [AJ94, AJM00, HO00, McC98]). The copy-cat strategy cp A : A 1 ⊸ A 2 on a game A is defined by:
where the subscripts 1, 2 on A are to distinguish the two copies of A. ◭ Next, to formulate the composition of strategies, it is convenient to first define the following intermediate concept:
. Given strategies σ : A ⊸ B, τ : B ⊸ C, we define their parallel composition σ τ by:
where pr B df. ; it is not a well-defined operation (however, for "dynamic" games and strategies in [YA16] , it is well-defined and rather plays an important role).
We now define the composition of strategies, which can be phrased as "parallel composition plus hiding" [A + 97].
we define their composition σ; τ : A ⊸ C by σ; τ df.
◮ Notation. We also write τ • σ for a composition σ; τ .
◮ Remark. Strictly speaking, the above definition is incomplete as it does not specify the resulting justifiers. For such a detail, see [McC98] .
Next, we define tensor product of strategies, which is the "disjoint union of strategies without interaction". 
We proceed to define the construction of paring.
◮ Definition 2.1.24 (Paring [AJM00, McC98] ). Given strategies σ : C ⊸ A, τ : C ⊸ B, we define their paring σ, τ : C ⊸ A&B by:
Next, we define a construction which is fundamental when we equip the categories of games and strategies in [AJM00, McC98] with a cartesian closed structure: ◮ Definition 2.1.25 (Promotion [AJM00, McC98] ). Given a strategy σ : !A ⊸ B, we define its
Intuitively, the promotion σ † is the strategy which plays as σ for each thread.
◮ Remark. Before defining derelictions, we make a brief detour:
◮ If the exponential ! were a comonad (in the form of a co-Kleisli triple), then there would be a strategy der A : !A ⊸ A which should be called the dereliction on A, satisfying der † A = cp !A and σ † ; der B = σ, for any games A, B and strategy σ : !A ⊸ B.
◮ It appears that we may take the copy-cat strategy cp A as der A ; however, it does not work for an arbitrary game A, as described in [McC98] . In fact, we have to require games to be well-opened.
◮ Note that if B is well-opened, then so is the linear implication A ⊸ B for any game A.
◮ In the cartesian closed category of games and strategies in [McC98] , all games are wellopened, and exponentials are given by A → B df.
= !A ⊸ B, which are thus well-opened.
◮ Also, note that even if a game A is well-opened, its exponential !A is not. However, in the cartesian closed category, exponential ! is not an allowed construction; thus the objects remain well-opened.
Now we are ready to define derelictions:
. Let A be a well-opened game. Then we define a strategy der A : !A ⊸ A, called the dereliction on A, to be the copy-cat strategy cp A . ◭
Predicative Games
One of the main problems in interpreting intuitionistic type theory in terms of games and strategies is how to interpret universes as games; e.g., the game-theoretic model in [AJV15] does not interpret universes. Our solution is to allow "names" of games to be moves of other games. However, a naive formulation would result in a Russell-like paradox: We would have a game of all games. To circumvent this problem, we will "type" moves and games. Also, we shall propose a "standard form" of games. The resulting games and strategies, called predicative games and generalized strategies, will have enough structures to interpret the type theory.
Our variant of games and strategies makes several generalizations of the existing variants. It generalizes the relation "σ is a strategy on a game G" in such a way that it makes sense to say that "a predicative game A is a generalized strategy on another predicative game B", which interprets the phenomenon in the type theory that every type is a term of a universe. Additionally, it generalizes the existing notion of games in such a way that a predicative game can be a sort of a "family of games", which is to interpret constructions such as dependent function space and dependent pair space in the type theory, as well. Accordingly, all the constructions on games and strategies in Sections 2.1.5, 2.1.7 are generalized and unified in a systematic way, in which a new inductive structure arises.
This section presents predicative games and generalized strategies; in particular, we define universe games as a certain kind of predicative games.
Typed Games
As mentioned above, our games should be able to have "names" of games as moves. Thus, a move is either a "mere" move or the "name" of another game. Importantly, such a distinction should not be ambiguous, because, conceptually, each move in a game must have a definite role. This naturally leads us to require that moves are "typed", which also works to avoid a Russell-like paradox as we shall see shortly.
We begin with typing moves.
◮ Definition 3.1.1 (Typed moves). For a game, a move is said to be typed if it is a pair (m, k) of some object m and a natural number k ∈ N, which is usually written [m] k . A typed move [m] k is more specifically called a k-type move, and k is said to be the type of the move. In particular, a 0-type move is called a mere move. ◭ Our intension is as follows: A mere move is just a move of a game in the usual sense, and a (k +1)-type move is the "name" of another game such that the supremum of the types of the moves is k (see Definition 3.1.2 below).
Based on types of moves, we now define the notion of typed games.
◮ Definition 3.1.2 (Typed games).
A typed game is a game whose moves are all typed. The type of a typed game G, written T (G), is defined by:
One may wonder if the type of a typed game can be transfinite; however, as we shall see, the type of a predicative game is always a natural number. Also, we have defined T (G)
df.
= 1 if M G = ∅ as such a game G can be seen as a trivial case of a game that has mere moves only.
We now define "names" of games:
◮ Definition 3.1.3 (Names of games). The name of a typed game G, written N (G), is defined to be the pair (G, T (G)) of G (as a set) itself and its type T (G). ◭
Note that the name of a typed game can be a typed move; however, that name cannot be a move of the game itself because of the typing method, which is how we shall avoid a Russelllike paradox (see Proposition 3.3.3 below).
1-predicative and 2-predicative Games
In the next section, we shall define a certain kind of typed games, called predicative games, which are the games to interpret types of intuitionistic type theory. For this, we define in this section a preliminary version of predicative games with the lowest and second lowest types, called 1 -predicative games and 2 -predicative games, respectively, as a preparation. As we shall see, they are essentially strategies and games in the usual game semantics.
◮ Remark. This section serves as a "bridge" between the usual notion of games and strategies on one hand and predicative games and generalized strategies in the next section on the other hand. Thus, the reader may safely skip it and jump to the next section.
First, we define essential equality on moves, legal positions, and games: ◮ Definition 3.2.1 (Essential equality on moves, legal positions, and games). For a game G, moves m, m ′ ∈ M G are said to be essentially equal and written m ∼ = m ′ if they are the same elements up to the "tags" for disjoint union. Also, legal positions s, s When considering essential equality between games G, we must ensure that the structure
We then use the following definition to ensure that the resulting game satisfies these conditions when a certain construction is applied.
◮ Definition 3.2.2 (Consistent sets of games).
A set S of games is said to be consistent if, for any A, B ∈ S, it satisfies the following:
◭ Now, observe the following:
◮ Proposition 3.2.3 (Games as collections of strategies).
A game G corresponds to the set of its strategies σ : G in the following sense:
1. For any game G, we have:
where λ σ , ⊢ σ , σ are the obvious modifications of λ σ , ⊢ σ , σ up to the "tags" for the disjoint union σ:G M σ of moves, and the quotient /∼ = is taken only for the essential equality that arises when taking the disjoint union σ:G M σ .
For any consistent set S of strategies (not necessarily on the same game), the game
where the symbol ( ) has the same meaning as in the clause 1 and the quotient /∼ = is taken only for the essential equality that arises when taking the disjoint union τ ∈S M τ , is well-defined and has (τ ) S/∼ = as its strategy for all τ ∈ S. Moreover, the converse inclusion also holds (i.e., every strategy on S/∼ = is in S) if S = {σ |σ : G} for some game G.
Proof. Let G be a game. We first show the clause 1. Note that ∼ = is clearly an equivalence relation on σ:G M σ , and the quotient of each component is well-defined. For the sets of moves and the enabling relations, the inclusion ⊇ is obvious, but the converse inclusion holds as well because G is economical and by the equation P G = σ:G σ established below. Then, the labelling functions clearly coincide. For the valid positions, it suffices to show the equation
For the other inclusion, assume that s ∈ P G ; we show s ∈ σ for some σ : G. If s is of even-length, then we may just take σ df.
= pref({s}) even . If s is of odd-length, say s = tm with even(t), then we take σ df.
= pref({t}) even . It remains to verify the clause 2. Again, ∼ = is an equivalence relation on τ ∈S M τ , and the quotient of each component is well-defined because the set S is consistent. Then the first half of the clause 2 is obvious; and the second half immediately follows from the clause 1.
◮ Notation. From now on, in a similar situation, we shall abbreviate λ σ , ⊢ σ , σ as λ σ , ⊢ σ , σ, respectively. In practice, this will not cause a confusion.
This proposition has several important implications. Firstly, we may identify a game G with the structure σ:G σ df.
Secondly, a game can be defined "in terms of strategies" (without underlying games). Usually, the notion of strategies in game semantics comes after that of games, but the proposition enables us to reverse the order. 8 ◮ Remark. Of course, when we consider strategies, we usually have the underlying game in our minds. What we are saying here is that we may form a game from strategies even without such an a priori concept of underlying games, which is something like to define any set of ordered pairs as a relation (even without a concept of what the relation really is).
Importantly, for the clause 2 of Proposition 3.2.3, even if a set S of strategies is not consistent, we may form its partition whose elements are consistent subsets of S and take a quotient ∼ = only within such subsets. As a result, the game S/∼ = can be seen as a sort of a "family of games". We shall come back to this point later.
◮ Notation. For a finite sequence of moves s = m 1 m 2 . . . m n and an integer k ∈ Z, we define
This applies for infinite sequences as well in the obvious way. Now, we define 1 -predicative games, which are essentially strategies on well-opened games.
◮ Definition 3.2.4 (1-predicative games (preliminary)). A 1-predicative game is a game σ 1 , where σ : G is any strategy on a well-opened game G, defined as follows:
= {s 0 | s ∈ σ}, where the justifiers are preserved (i.e.,
We put the term "preliminary" here because we shall present a different (but equivalent) definition of 1-predicative games in the next section, which we shall take as "official".
◮ Lemma 3.2.5 (1-predicative lemma). A 1 -predicative game is a well-defined 1-type game that is well-opened.
Proof. Clear from the definition.
Next, we define 2 -predicative games, which are essentially well-opened games in [McC98] .
◮ Definition 3.2.6 (2-predicative games (preliminary)). A 2-predicative game is a game St(G), where G is a well-opened game, defined as follows:
◮ The enabling relation is defined by:
where N (σ 1 ) is justified by q G , and moves [m] 0 in s 0 such that m is initial in G are justified by N (σ 1 ). ◭ ◮ Remark. Again, we have the term "preliminary" because we will give a more generalized definition of 2-predicative games in the next section, which we shall take as "official".
In view of Proposition 3.2.3 (the clause 1), a 2-predicative game St(G) is almost essentially equal to the well-opened game G; also by Proposition 3.2.3 (the clause 2), strategies on St(G) and strategies on G are roughly the same. The difference lies only in that St(G) is typed and starts a play with a question and answer about Player's strategy, and a play to follow must conform the declared strategy.
As one expects, we have:
◮ Lemma 3.2.7 (2-predicative lemma). A 2-predicative game is a well-defined 2-type game that is well-opened.
Proof. Let St(G) be a 2-predicative game. First, it is straightforward to see that St(G) is a wellopened game, in which the visibility condition is satisfied because G is well-opened. And it is of 2-type by the the moves N (σ 1 ).
To sum up, we have shown in this section that (the preliminary version of) 2-predicative and 1-predicative games are essentially well-opened games and strategies on them. With this fact, predicative games and generalized strategies, which will be defined in the next section, can be seen as a generalization of games and strategies, respectively.
Predicative Games and Generalized Strategies
This section presents our variant of games and strategies. 9 We define k-predicative games for each k ∈ Z 1 and generalized strategies in such a way that it makes sense to say that a k-predicative game is a generalized strategy on an l-predicative game with k < l. This structure will interpret the phenomenon in the type theory that a type is a term of a universe.
◮ Notation. From now on, we just write m for typed moves [m] k when it is not necessary to exhibit the type k.
◮ Definition 3.3.1 (Predicative games and generalized strategies). A 1-type game G is said to be 1-predicative if it is well-opened and deterministic on even-length positions, and satisfies M G ⊆ N ×{0}. A generalized strategy (or strategy for short) on an l-type game G, l ∈ Z 2 , is a k-predicative game σ with k < l whose name N (σ) occurs in P G such that there is no preceding name of a typed game, i.e., for all s.N (σ).t ∈ P G , s contains mere moves only. In this case, we write σ : G. For each k ∈ Z 2 , a k-type game G is said to be k-predicative, if it satisfies the following:
where N (σ) is justified by q G and the initial moves of σ in s are justified by N (σ).
A predicative game is a k-predicative game for some k ∈ Z 2 . Moreover, a generalized strategy with type 1 is particularly called a strict strategy. ◭ ◮ Remark. Note that predicative games are inductively defined along with their types, and moves of 1-predicative games are required to be natural numbers 10 (with type 0). As a consequence, the class of moves of a predicative game will never be a proper class.
By Lemma 2.1.18 and Proposition 3.2.3, a 2-predicative game and 1-predicative games on it 11 in the sense of Definitions 3.2.6, 3.2.4 can be seen as a particular kind of a 2-predicative game and generalized strategies on it in the sense of Definition 3.3.1. Moreover, a 2-predicative game in the latter sense is a generalization 12 of a 2-predicative game in the former sense (and the usual notion of a game by Proposition 3.2.3) because its generalized strategies may not have it as a common underlying game, or they may not range over all the strategies (in the usual sense) on it. In particular, we may form a predicative game that can be seen as a "family of games"; see, e.g., Definition 5.1.2. From now on, we shall take Definition 3.3.1 as the "official" definition.
◮ Notation. For each k ∈ Z 2 , we denote PG k for the set of all k-predicative games. Also, we write PG k for the set of all i-predicative games with 2 i k. Moreover, for any predicative game G and integer k ∈ Z 1 , we write gs(G) and gs k (G) for the set of all generalized strategies on G and its subset consisting of k-type ones only, respectively. Furthermore, GS k (resp. GS k ) denotes the set of all generalized strategies with k-type (resp. l-type with 1 l k). Additionally, we informally write G ∈ PG and S ∈ GS to mean that G is a predicative game and S is a generalized strategy, respectively. ◮ Remark. We have PG = GS 2 by Lemma 3.3.7 below, which corresponds to the phenomenon in the type theory that all types can be regarded as terms (of universes), but "strict" terms cannot be types.
In a predicative game G, a play starts with a question q G and answer N (σ) about a strategy σ to play, then Opponent and Player iterate such a communication, decreasing the type of predicative games, until they have reached at a strict strategy, and finally a play by the strict strategy follows. In other words, predicative games are a generalization of MC-games in which we enforce such a "protocol" of plays that gradually narrows down the range of possible plays.
◮ Convention. Note that we no longer need the terminology "1-predicative games"; it was just for the concise way of defining generalized strategies. In fact, since a 1-predicative game is not a predicative game, the term is now very confusing. Hence, from now on, we always call 1-predicative games (generalized or more precisely strict) strategies.
Note that every generalized strategy is "total" in the sense that it always has a response. However, we actually do not lose the generality to have non-total strategies: ◮ Definition 3.3.2 (Total generalized strategies). A generalized strategy σ : G is said to be total if every play s ∈ σ that is maximal (with respect to the prefix relation ) in σ is maximal in any generalized strategy τ : G such that s ∈ τ up to the "tags" for disjoint union. ◭
It is straightforward to see that this definition coincides with the notion of "total strategies" in the usual game semantics (see Definition 2.1.16). Note that we are not concerned that much with totality of generalized strategies in the present paper because we are aiming to obtain just a soundness, not necessarily (full) completeness, result.
As mentioned earlier, a motivation for the definition of predicative games is to obtain games of games without a Russell-like paradox. We now establish the fact that they are in fact paradox-free. Proof. Let G be a k-predicative game with k ∈ Z 2 . By the definition, every move [m] l ∈ M G satisfies l < k. Thus, since the name N (G) has type k, it cannot be a move in M G .
This result is certainly assuring: If we did not type moves nor games, and defined the name of each predicative game G to be, e.g., G itself, then we could define a (type-free) predicative game P by gs(P) df.
= {G ∈ PG | G / ∈ gs(G)}. This is a game-theoretic variant of the famous Russell's paradox: If P ∈ gs(P), then P / ∈ gs(P); and if P / ∈ gs(P), then P ∈ gs(P). Next, we introduce two very convenient constructions.
◮ Definition 3.3.4 (Parallel union of predicative games). Given an integer k ∈ Z 2 and a set S ⊆ PG k of i-predicative games with 2 i k, we define the predicative game S, called the parallel union of S, as follows:
= pref({q S .s | ∃G ∈ S. q G s ∈ P G }), where moves m in s with q G ⊢ G m are justified by q S . ◭ That is, the parallel union construction forms a predicative game from a set of predicative games by "unifying the first moves".
◮ Remark. The parallel union appears similar to the product & defined below. However, there is a definitive difference: Player always chooses the component game to play in the former, while Opponent does it in the latter.
It is easy to see that:
◮ Lemma 3.3.5 (Well-defined parallel union). For any k ∈ Z 2 and S ⊆ PG k , the parallel union S is a well-defined sup({T (G)|G ∈ S})-predicative game that satisfies gs( S) = G∈S gs(G).
Another construction is similar but on generalized strategies:
◮ Definition 3.3.6 (Predicative union of generalized strategies). Given an integer k ∈ Z 1 and a set S ⊆ GS k of generalized strategies with type k, we define the predicative game S, called the predicative union of S, as follows:
= pref({q S .N (S).s | S ∈ S. s ∈ P S }), where N (S) is justified by q S and the moves in s that are initial in S are justified by N (S). ◭
Then it is immediate that:
◮ Lemma 3.3.7 (Well-defined predicative union). For any k ∈ Z 1 and S ⊆ GS k , the predicative union S is a well-defined (sup({T (S )|S ∈ S}) + 1 )-predicative game that satisfies gs( S) = S. Moreover, any predicative game G ∈ PG is the predicative union of its strategies, i.e., G = gs(G).
The lemma enables us to show that PG k = ∅ for all k ∈ Z 2 in a concise way: We define a 2-predicative game I 2 df.
= {I 1 }, where I 1 df.
= I is the empty game; we then inductively define a (k + 1)-predicative game I k+1 by I k+1 df.
= {I k } for each k ∈ Z 2 . As a consequence, we have I k ∈ PG k for all k ∈ Z 2 . Also, we have I j : I j+1 for all j ∈ Z 1 , establishing another fact that GS j = ∅ for all j ∈ Z 1 . Now, let us sketch how the "protocol" of predicative games works to interpret intuitionistic type theory. A distinguishing feature of the type theory is dependent types, i.e., families (B(a) : U) a:A of types B(a) indexed by terms a on a type A. Moreover, we may construct a dependent function type a:A B(a) whose terms represent functions f : A → a:A B(a) that satisfy f (x) : B(x) for all x : A. A dependent function type a:A B(a) is a generalization of a function type A → B where B is a "constant" dependent type, i.e., B(a) = B for all a : A.
It is then a challenge to interpret this structure in game semantics: Omitting the semantic bracket , an interpretation of the dependent function type a:A B(a) should be a generalization of implication A → B = !A ⊸ B of games, where B may depended on the strategy on A which Opponent chooses to play. Our solution is to require the "protocol" of predicative games: We shall interpret the dependent function type by the subgame of the implication A → {B(σ) | σ : A}, in which we require the "type-matching" condition on strategies τ , i.e., τ • σ † : B(σ) for all σ : A. Now, the "protocol" becomes something like q B .q A .N (σ).N (τ • σ † ), and then a play in the specified implication σ → τ • σ † follows. This nicely captures the phenomenon of dependent function types, but imposes another challenge: The implication A → {B(σ)|σ : A} no longer has the "protocol" because the second move q A is not the name of the game to follow. Even if we somehow enforce the "protocol", then it seems that we would lose the initial questions and answers q B .q A .N (σ).N (τ • σ † ) to determine the game σ → B(σ) to play. We address this problem in Section 4 and in fact interpret dependent function types in Section 5.2.
Subgame Relation
Next, we generalize the subgame relation on games defined in Section 2.1.6 to define an appropriate one on predicative games.
◮ Definition 3.4.1 (Subgame relation on predicative games). A subgame of a k-predicative game G, k ∈ Z 2 , is a k-predicative game S that satisfies gs(S) ⊆ gs(G). In this case, we write S G. Moreover, we write sub(G) for the set of all subgames of G. ◭
As a result, S G iff gs(S) ⊆ gs(G).
Thus, in particular, the subgame relation forms a partial order on the set PG k for each k ∈ Z 2 . Also, because of the generalization which the notion of predicative games makes, the subgame relation between predicative games is finer than the subgame relation between MC-games (see Definition 2.1.9).
Universe Games
Now, we interpret universes by certain predicative games, which should be called universe games. Note that we are interested in a predicative type theory with a hierarchy of universes; so we shall construct the corresponding hierarchy of the universe games. ◮ Definition 3.5.1 (Universe games). The k th universe game U k , for each natural number k ∈ N, is defined by U k df.
= PG k+2 . A universe game refers to the k th universe game U k for some k ∈ N, and it is often abbreviated as U. ◭ By Lemma 3.3.7, G ∈ PG k+2 ⇔ G : U k for all k ∈ N. Thus, as intended, the k th universe game U k is the "universe" of all i-predicative games with 2 i k + 2. Intuitively, a play of a universe game U starts with the Opponent's question q U "What is your game?", and Player answers it by the name of a predicative game such as N (G), meaning "It is the game G!", and then a play in G follows.
Of course, we have:
◮ Corollary 3.5.2 (Predicativity of universe games). For each k ∈ N, the k th universe game U k is a well-defined (k +3 )-predicative game.
Proof. By Lemma 3.3.7 and the fact that PG k = ∅ for all k ∈ Z 2 .
As a consequence, we have U i : U j for all i, j ∈ N with i < j. Thus, we obtain a hierarchy of the universe games: U 0 : U 1 : U 2 . . .
The Category of Predicative Games and Generalized Strategies
In this section, we first modify the constructions on games and strategies of [McC98] (see Sections 2.1.5, 2.1.7) in such a way that the new ones preserve the predicativity of games, and then define the category PG of predicative games and generalized strategies. As explained earlier, we cannot simply adopt the usual constructions, because, e.g., the linear implication of two predicative games is not predicative (as the second move would not be the name of a game to follow); thus, we need appropriate modifications. First, for convenience, we employ:
◮ Notation. We write ♠ i∈I G i either for the tensor product G 1 ⊗ G 2 , the linear implication G 1 ⊸ G 2 , the product G 1 &G 2 , the exponential !G 1 , or the composition G 2 • G 1 of predicative games G i , i ∈ I, which we shall define below, where I is an appropriate "index set". Similarly, we write ♣ j∈J S j either for the tensor product S 1 ⊗ S 2 , the composition S 2 • S 1 , the paring S 1 &S 2 , or the promotion !S 1 of generalized strategies S j , j ∈ J, which we will define below.
◮ Remark. For a uniform treatment, we write & and ! for paring and promotion of strategies, respectively. In fact, paring and promotion are essentially the same operations with product and exponential of games, respectively, in the usual game semantics; see Sections 2.1.5, 2.1.7.
As we shall see, it is the case for predicative games as well.
◮ Convention. Whenever we say "a composition T • S of games", the games S, T are always assumed to be "composable", i.e., S A ⊸ B and T B ⊸ C for some games A, B, C. 
Constructions on Predicative Games
In this section, we define constructions on predicative games. As a preparation, observe the following:
◮ Lemma 4.1.1 (Type increment lemma). Every predicative game G induces another predicative game
Proof. By Lemma 3.3.7.
As a consequence, we may induce a predicative game G +n with T (G +n ) = T (G) + n for any predicative game G and natural number n: G +n is constructed from G by the n-time iteration of the operation ( ) +1 in Lemma 4.1.1. Note that G +n is a trivial modification of G that just increases the type of G by n.
Also, the lemma enables us to generalize the phenomenon of the existing games and strategies that a strategy σ : G is a particular kind of subgame σ G 14 (see Section 2.1.6):
◮ Proposition 4.1.2 (Generalized strategies as subgames). A generalized strategy
Proof. Immediate from the definition.
A main challenge in this section is how to define linear implication inductively; the other constructions have obvious inductive structures. For this, we need the following: ◮ Definition 4.1.3 (Families of PLIs). Let A, B be predicative games with the same type. A family of point-wise linear implications (or family of PLIs) from A to B is a pair (f, (φ σ ) σ:A ) of a function f ∈ gs(B) gs(A) , called the extensional collapse, and a collection (φ σ σ ⊸ f (σ)) σ:A of subgames φ σ , called the point-wise linear implications (or PLIs). If A, B are 2-predicative, then we additionally require that φ σ is deterministic on even-length positions for all σ : A. ◭ Of course this definition is applicable only for 2-predicative games at the moment; PLIs for other cases will be defined as soon as we define linear implication inductively below.
◮ Notation. A family of PLIs from A to B is usually represented just by its PLIs (φ σ ) σ:A with its extensional collapse, usually written π φ , implicit. Now, we are ready to define constructions on predicative games: ◮ Definition 4.1.4 (Constructions on predicative games). For any family (G i ) i∈I of predicative games, the predicative game ♠ i∈I G i is inductively defined as follows:
1. First, by the operation ( ) +1 in Lemma 4.1.1, we may assume that the predicative games
2. We define ♠ i∈I G i df.
= {♠ i∈I σ i | ∀i ∈ I. σ i : G i } if ♠ is either tensor product, product, exponential, or composition; and define: = &{φ σ1 |σ 1 :
For the base case, we apply the usual constructions (in Sections 2.1.5, 2.1.7). ◭ ◮ Notation. Let G 1 , G 2 be predicative games. A generalized strategy &{φ σ1 |σ 1 : G 1 } on a linear implication G 1 ⊸ G 2 is usually written φ; in other words, a generalized strategy φ : G 1 ⊸ G 2 is a product φ = &{φ σ1 |σ 1 : G 1 } of subgames (φ σ1 σ 1 ⊸ π φ (σ 1 )) σ1:G1 , where how each strategy φ σ1 plays on G 2 is determined by a specified function π φ ∈ gs(G 2 ) gs(G1) .
That is, the constructions on predicative games are essentially the usual constructions on games (in Section 2.1.5), augmented with a systematic operation on the questions and answers about the names of games that preserves predicativity. In fact, if we take 2-predicative games that correspond to MC-games (in the way we did in Section 3.2), then it is straightforward to see that our constructions are essentially the same as the constructions on MC-games (in Section 2.1.5).
We now establish an important fact:
◮ Theorem 4.1.5 (Well-defined constructions on predicative games). The class of predicative games is closed under all the constructions defined in Definition 4.1.4 except for tensor product and exponential which just do not preserve well-openedness.
Proof. For tensor product, product, exponential, and linear implication, it is straightforward to show the theorem by a simple induction on sup({T (G i ) | i ∈ I }) with Lemma 3.3.7. It remains to consider composition; the following lemma handles it.
◮ Lemma 4.1.6 (Composition on subgames). Let S A ⊸ B, T B ⊸ C be any predicative games. Then we have the subgame relation T • S A ⊸ C.
Proof of the lemma. Assume that S, T are both k-predicative by Lemma 4.1.1. We show the claim by induction on k. The base case k = 0 is easier 15 than and similar to the inductive case, so we omit it here. For the inductive case k+1, recall that:
A is a family of PLIs from A to B } T B ⊸ C ⇔ gs(T ) ⊆ gs(B ⊸ C) = {ψ |(ψ τ ) τ :B is a family of PLIs from B to C }.
Hence, by the definition, This completes the proof of the theorem.
Note in particular that when we focus on 2-predicative games that correspond to MC-games (see Section 3.2), the tensor product, product, exponential, and linear implication on predicative games are essentially the same as the corresponding operations on MC-games (in Section 2.1.5).
Let us see a simple example.
◮ Example 4.1.7. In MC-games and innocent strategies, we have a game N mc of natural numbers,
= pref({q.n | n ∈ N }). Let us write n for the strategy pref({q.n}) for each n ∈ N. The corresponding 2-predicative game N consists of:
[n] 0 |n ∈ N }). Moreover, typical plays in the linear implication N ⊸ N are of the form q N⊸N .N (φ).s, where s ∈ φ n : n ⊸ π φ (n) for some n ∈ N. That is, Opponent first asks a question q N⊸N about a strategy to play, and Player declares a (strict) strategy φ = &{φ n | n ∈ N }; then a play in the usual implication N mc ⊸ N mc follows, in which Opponent first has to (implicitly) select a strategy n, and then a play by φ n follows. It is clear that the implication N ⊸ N is essentially the same as the usual one N mc ⊸ N mc . Also, this example illustrates the point that our linear implication preserves the predicativity of games.
Constructions on Generalized Strategies
We may apply the same idea to define constructions on generalized strategies. ◮ Definition 4.2.1 (Constructions on generalized strategies). For a family (S j ) j∈J of generalized strategies, the generalized strategy ♣ j∈J S j is inductively defined as follows:
1. First, by the operation ( ) +1 in Lemma 4.1.1, we may assume that the generalized strategies S j , j ∈ J, are all of sup({T (S j )|j ∈ J})-type.
2. If the generalized strategies S j , j ∈ J, are all strict, then we define ♣ j∈J S j df.
= ♣ ′ j∈J S j , where ♣ ′ is the corresponding construction on strategies defined in Section 2.1.7.
16 15 Here, we use the established fact in MC-games that composition of innocent strategies is well-defined; see [McC98] for the details. 16 For this, we think of strict strategies as innocent strategies on themselves (as games) by Lemma 2.1.19.
3. Otherwise, we define ♣ j∈J S j df.
= {♣ j∈J τ j | ∀j ∈ J. τ j : S j } if ♣ is either tensor product, paring, or promotion; and define ψ • φ df.
= &{ψ π φ (σ) • φ σ | σ : A} if ♣ is composition and S 1 = φ : A ⊸ B, S 2 = ψ : B ⊸ C for some predicative games A, B, C. ◭ Now, we prove one of the main theorems of the present paper: 
If σ
Proof. It is straightforward to show that each construction is well-defined by induction on sup({T (S j ) | j ∈ J}) with Lemmata 3.3.7, 4.1.6, for which note that the case for strict strategies is already established in the literature (see [McC98] for the proofs). The clauses 1, 2 are obvious by the definition, where for σ 1 &σ 2 : D ⊸ A 1 &A 2 note that we have a correspondence
We have defined various constructions on generalized strategies, but we do not have any "atomic" strategies yet. In [AJM00, McC98] , there are two such atomic strategies: The copy-cat strategies cp G : G ⊸ G, and the derelictions der G : !G ⊸ G (see Section 2.1.7). We now generalize these two strategies.
◮ Definition 4.2.3 (Generalized copy-cat strategies). The (generalized) copy-cat strategy cp
G : G ⊸ G on a k-predicative game G, k ∈ Z 2 ,
is inductively defined as follows:
◮ If G is 2-predicative, then we define cp G df.
= &{cp σ |σ : G}, where cp σ : σ ⊸ σ is the usual one defined in Definition 2.1.20, and π cp df.
= id gs(G) (i.e., the identity function on gs(G)).
The idea is simple: The copy-cat strategy cp G on a k-predicative game G just waits until a play has reached at a 2-predicative game G, and then it plays as the usual copy-cat strategy cp G .
◮ Lemma 4.2.4 (Well-defined copy-cat strategies). For any predicative game G, the copy-cat strategy cp G is a well-defined strategy on G ⊸ G that satisfies the unit law (with respect to the composition •).
Proof. First, for any predicative game G, it is straightforward to see that the copy-cat strategy cp G is a well-defined generalized strategy on G ⊸ G by induction on the type of G.
Next, let A ⊸ B be a linear implication. We show, by induction on the type of the linear implication, that κ • cp A = κ and cp B • κ = κ for all κ : A ⊸ B, and S • cp showing that the unit law holds (where we use the fact that the usual copy-cat strategies in MC-games satisfy the unit law; see [McC98] ). Also, it follows that, for any subgame S A ⊸ B, we have:
For the inductive case in which T (κ) = k + 1, we have:
by the induction hypothesis, showing that the unit law holds. Again, it follows that, for any subgame S A ⊸ B, we have:
which completes the proof.
In a completely analogous way, we may generalize derelictions:
◮ Definition 4.2.5 (Generalized derelictions). The (generalized) dereliction der
G : !G ⊸ G on a k-predicative game G, k ∈ Z 2 ,
is inductively defined as follows:
◮ If G is 2-predicative, then we define der G df.
= &{der σ | σ : G }, where der σ : !σ ⊸ σ is the usual one defined in Definition 2.1.26, and π der ∈ gs(G) gs(!G) is defined to be the function such that !σ → σ for all σ : G. = max(i, j). We often represent this phenomenon rather casually by A : U ∧ B : U ⇒ A ⊸ B, A&B : U.
The Category of Predicative Games and Generalized Strategies
Based on constructions on predicative games and generalized strategies defined in the previous sections, we now proceed to define a category of predicative games and generalized strategies. Proof. By Theorems 4.1.5, 4.2.2, we may straightforwardly generalize the proof in [McC98] that establishes the (cartesian closed) category of MC-games and innocent strategies.
◮ Convention. From now on, we often call predicative games and generalized strategies just games and strategies, respectively.
Game-theoretic Interpretation of ETT
We now propose an interpretation of the extensional variant of intuitionistic type theory (ETT) by predicative games and generalized strategies. Our approach is based on the notion of categories with families (or CwFs for short) proposed in [Dyb96] because it is in general easier to show that a structure is an instance of a CwF than to directly establish that it is a model of the type theory. We first define additional constructions on games, which serve as preliminary notions, and then we define our game-theoretic CwF EPG for ETT, and equip it with semantic type formers.
Dependent Games and Dependent Union
In the type theory, a dependent type B over a type A is a family {B(a) | a : A } of types B(a) indexed by terms a on the type A. Hence, it is natural to define: ◮ Definition 5.1.1 (Dependent games). A dependent game over a predicative game A is a family B = {Bσ : U |σ : A} of predicative games Bσ indexed by strategies σ on A.
◭ Note that we can identify a dependent game B over A with the strategy B : A → U that plays exclusively in U (after the "protocol") in the obvious way. To interpret various types, in which dependent types are involved, the following construction plays an important role:
◮ Definition 5.1.2 (Dependent union). Given a dependent game B over a predicative game A, we define its dependent union ⊎B by ⊎B df.
= {Bσ |σ : A}. ◭ By Lemma 3.3.5, the construction of dependent union is well-defined, where a universe game U serves as an "upper bound" of the types of Bσ. With this construction, it is now clear that a predicative game is a generalization of a game that can be a "family of games". We shall see concrete examples shortly.
Dependent Function Space
We proceed to define a game-theoretic structure to interpret dependent function types (also called dependent product types or -types) a:A B(a), where A is a type and B : A → U is a dependent type, in intuitionistic type theory. ◮ Definition 5.2.1 (Dependent function space). The dependent function space (A, B) of a dependent game B over a game A is the subgame of the implication A → ⊎B whose strategies τ satisfy ∀σ : A. τ • σ : Bσ. ◭
The idea is simple: It represents the type of (set-theoretic) functions f : A → a∈A B(a) that satisfies f (a) ∈ B(a) for all a ∈ A. Note that when B is the "constant" dependent game, i.e., Bσ = B for all σ : A, the dependent function space (A, B) coincides with the implication A → B as expected.
However, we will have to handle the case where A is a dependent game; so this definition is not general enough. In terms of the type theory, we can interpret the rule Γ, x : A ⊢ B(x) type ⇒ Γ ⊢ x:A B(x) type only when Γ = ♦ (the empty context) at the moment. This is why we use the symbol here; we shall define a more general construction of dependent function space shortly.
◮ Example 5.2.2. Let Fin
N : N → U be a dependent game of finite sequences of natural numbers:
is a 2-predicative game whose plays are prefixes of sequences q 1 n 1 . . . q k n k for some n 1 , . . . , n k ∈ N (omitting the initial "protocol") that denote k-tuples (n 1 , . . . , n k ) ∈ N k . Let us write n 1 . . . n k for the strategy pref({q 1 n 1 . . . q k n k }). Then, it is not hard to see that, for any Opponent's choice of a strategy k : N, a strategy φ : (N, Fin N ) plays as φ k : k → Fin N (k); e.g.,
we have the "constant zero" strategy z : (N, Fin N ) defined by z df.
Dependent Pair Space
Similar to dependent function space, we define the dependent pair space construction on games, reflecting the dependent pair types (also called dependent sum types or -types) a:A B(a).
◮ Definition 5.3.1 (Dependent pair space). The dependent pair space (A, B) of a dependent game B over a game A is the subgame of the product A&(⊎B) whose strategies are the parings σ&τ of strategies σ : A, τ : Bσ.
Again, this construction is not general enough; we shall define a more general construction of dependent pair space in a later section. Also, note that when B is the constant dependent game, the dependent pair space (A, B) coincides with the product A&B as expected.
◮ Example 5.3.2. Consider the dependent pair space (N, Fin N ). Its typical play starts with Opponent's question about a strategy to play, and then Player answers it by the name of a paring k&(n 1 . . . n k ), where k : N, n 1 . . . n k : Fin N (k). Then, if Opponent chooses to play in the first component, then the moves q.k follow; otherwise, the moves q 1 n 1 . . . q k n k follow. Thus, it represents the space of dependent pairs (k, (n 1 , . . . , n k )), where k, n 1 , . . . , n k ∈ N.
Identity Games
We now define games that correspond to the identity types (or Id-types). Our point of view is that equality in ETT corresponds to equality of strategies. Hence, it is reasonable to define copy-cat strategies as "proofs of the equalities". ◮ Definition 5.4.1 (Identity games). The identity game Id G (σ, τ ) for strategies σ, τ on a game G is defined to be the subgame of σ → τ such that
◭ I.e., a strategy cp σ : Id G (σ, τ ) is what "witnesses" the equality σ = τ ; and if such a strategy does not exist, then σ = τ .
Game-theoretic Category with Families for ETT
We are now ready to define a CwF of predicative games and generalized strategies. Note that a CwF immediately gives rise to a model: We may straightforwardly define the semantic counterparts in a CwF for all the contexts, types, and terms in the type theory, and every judgemental equality is preserved as the corresponding equation between the interpretations; for the details, see [Hof97] .
We first recall the definition of CwFs; our treatment is based on the presentation in [Hof97] .
◮ Definition 5.5.1 (CwFs [Dyb96, Hof97] ). A category with families (or a CwF for short) is a structure C = (C, Ty, Tm, { }, T, . , p, v, , ), where:
◮ C is a category.
◮ Ty assigns, to each object Γ ∈ C, a set Ty(Γ), called the set of types in the context Γ.
◮ Tm assigns, to each pair of an object Γ ∈ C and a type A ∈ Ty(Γ), a set Tm(Γ, A), called the set of terms of type A in the context Γ.
◮ For each morphism φ : ∆ → Γ in C, { } induces a function {φ} : Ty(Γ) → Ty(∆) and a family of functions ( {φ} A : Tm(Γ, A) → Tm(∆, A{φ})) A∈Ty(Γ) .
◮ T ∈ C is a terminal object.
◮ . assigns, to each pair of a context Γ ∈ C and a type A ∈ Ty(Γ), a context Γ.A ∈ C, called the comprehension of A.
◮ p associates each pair of a context Γ ∈ C and a type A ∈ Ty(Γ) with a morphism p(A) : Γ.A → Γ in C, called the first projection associated to A.
◮ v associates each pair of a context Γ ∈ C and a type A ∈ Ty(Γ) with a term v A ∈ Tm(Γ.A, A{p(A)}) called the second projection associated to A.
◮ , assigns, to each triple of a morphism φ : ∆ → Γ in C, a type A ∈ Ty(Γ), and a term τ ∈ Tm(∆, A{φ}), a morphism φ, τ A : ∆ → Γ.A in C, called the extension of φ by τ .
Moreover, it is required to satisfy the following axioms:
◮ Ty-Id. For each pair of a context Γ ∈ C and a type A ∈ Ty(Γ), we have A{id Γ } = A.
◮ Ty-Comp. Additionally, for any composable morphisms φ : ∆ → Γ, ψ : Θ → ∆ in C, we have A{φ • ψ} = A{φ}{ψ}.
◮ Tm-Id. Moreover, for any term σ ∈ Tm(Γ, A), we have σ{id Γ } = σ.
◮ Tm-Comp. Under the same assumption, we have σ{φ
We now define our CwF of predicative games and generalized strategies.
◮ Definition 5.5.2 (The CwF EPG). We define the CwF EPG of predicative games and generalized strategies to be the structure (EPG, Ty, Tm, { }, I, . , p, v, , ), where:
◮ The underlying category EPG is the category PG of predicative games and generalized strategies defined in Definition 4.3.1.
◮ For each game Γ ∈ EPG, we define Ty(Γ) to be the set of dependent games over Γ.
◮ For a game Γ ∈ EPG and a dependent game A ∈ Ty(Γ), we define Tm(Γ, A) to be the set of generalized strategies on the dependent function space (Γ, A).
◮ For each generalized strategy φ : ∆ → Γ in EPG, the function {φ} :
is defined by A{φ} df.
= {A(φ • δ) | δ : ∆} for all A ∈ Ty(Γ), and the functions {φ} A :
◮ I is the empty game (∅, ∅, ∅, {ǫ}).
◮ For a game Γ ∈ EPG and a dependent game A ∈ Ty(Γ), the comprehension Γ.A ∈ EPG of A in Γ is defined to be the dependent pair space (Γ, A).
◮ The first projections p(A) : (Γ, A) → Γ, where A is a dependent game on Γ, are the derelictions der Γ on Γ up to the "tags" for disjoint union. Next, we verify the required equations:
◮ Ty-Id. For any pair of a game Γ ∈ EPG and a dependent game A on Γ, we have:
◮ Ty-Comp. In addition, for any games ∆, Θ ∈ EPG and strategies ψ : Θ → ∆, φ : ∆ → Γ in EPG, we have:
◮ Tm-Id. Moreover, for any strategy σ : (Γ, A), we have:
◮ Tm-Comp. Under the same assumption, we have:
◮ Cons-L. Additionally, for any strategy τ : (∆, A{φ}), we clearly have:
◮ Cons-R. Under the same assumption, we have:
◮ Cons-Nat.
◮ Cons-Id.
Game-theoretic Type Formers
Note that a CwF handles only the "core" of intuitionistic type theory: It interprets just the syntax common to all the types. Thus, for a "full" interpretation of the type theory, we need to equip EPG with additional structures to interpret -, -and Id-types, as well as universes in the type theory, which of course enjoy the soundness property like the "core CwFs". This is the aim of the present section; we consider each type in order.
Game-theoretic Dependent Function Types
We begin with -types. First, we recall the general, categorical interpretation of -types. A, B) ).
◮ -Elim. Under the same assumption, for any terms κ ∈ Tm(Γ, (A, B) ), τ ∈ Tm(Γ, A), there is a term
where τ df.
= id Γ , τ A : Γ → Γ.A.
◮ -Comp. We have the equation
◮ -Subst. Moreover, for any context ∆ ∈ C and morphism φ : ∆ → Γ in C, we have
where φ
◮ λ-Subst. Under the same assumption, for any term ι ∈ Tm(Γ.A, B), we have
where note that (A{φ}, B{φ + }) ∈ Ty(∆).
◮ App-Subst. Finally, we have
where note that κ{φ} ∈ Tm(∆, (A{φ}, B{φ + })), τ {φ} ∈ Tm(∆, A{φ}), and φ
◭
We now propose our game-theoretic -types. ◮ -Comp. By a simple calculation, we have:
◮ -Subst. Moreover, for any ∆ ∈ EPG and φ : ∆ → Γ in EPG, we have:
where φ A{φ}) ). Note that the third equation holds because
◮ λ-Subst. For any term ι : ( (Γ, A), B), we clearly have:
◮ App-Subst. Finally, we have:
= ev • (κ{φ}&τ {φ}) = App(κ{φ}, τ {φ}).
Game-theoretic Dependent Pair Types
Next, we consider -types. Again, we begin with the general definition. in C.
◮ -Elim. For any type P ∈ Ty(Γ. (A, B) ) and term ψ ∈ Tm(Γ.A.B, P {Pair A,B }), there is a term R A,B,P (ψ) ∈ Tm(Γ. (A, B) , P ).
◮ -Subst. Moreover, for any context ∆ ∈ C and morphism φ : ∆ → Γ in C, we have:
◮ Pair-Subst. Under the same assumption, we have:
and
◮ R -Subst. Finally, we have:
◭ Now, we describe our game-theoretic interpretation of -types:
◮ Lemma 5.6.4 (EPG supports -types). The CwF EPG of predicative games and generalized strategies supports -types.
Proof. Let Γ ∈ EPG, A ∈ Ty(Γ), B ∈ Ty(Γ.A) in EPG. A, B) ) as the dereliction up to the correspondence.
◮
-Elim. By the above correspondence, for any dependent game P ∈ Ty( (Γ, (A, B))) and strategy ψ : ( ( (Γ, A) , B), P {Pair A,B }), we may construct the strategy R A,B,P (ψ) : , (A, B) ), P ) from ψ by R A,B,P (ψ) 
= R A{φ},B{φ + },P {φ * } (ψ{φ ++ }).
Game-theoretic Identity Types
Next, we consider identity types. Again, we first review the general, categorical interpretation.
◮ Definition 5.6.5 (CwFs with identity types [Hof97] ). A CwF C is said to support identity types (or Id-types) if:
◮ Id-Form. For each context Γ ∈ C and type A ∈ Ty(Γ), there is a type ◮ Id-Comp. We then have the equation
◮ Id-Subst. Furthermore, for any context ∆ ∈ C and morphism φ : ∆ → Γ in C, we have
where A{φ}
= A{φ}{p(A{φ})} ∈ Ty(∆.A{φ}), φ
A, and φ
◮ Refl-Subst. Also, the following equation holds
◭
We then equip our CwF EPG with a game-theoretic Id-types.
◮ Lemma 5.6.6 (EPG supports identity types). The CwF EPG of predicative games and generalized strategies supports identity types.
Proof. Let Γ ∈ EPG, A ∈ Ty(Γ) and B ∈ Ty(Γ.A.A + .Id A ) in EPG, where A + df.
= A{p(A)} ∈ Ty(Γ.A).
◮ Id-Form. We define the dependent game Id A ∈ Ty( ( (Γ, A), A + )) to be:
In other words, we define Id A ((γ&σ 1 )&σ 2 ) df.
◮ Id-Intro. The morphism
is defined to be the strategy that plays as the dereliction between (Γ, A 1 ) and (Γ, A 2 ), A 1 and A + 3 , or on Id A , where the subscripts are to distinguish the different copies of A.
◮ Id-Elim. For each strategy τ : ( (Γ, A), B{Refl A }) in EPG, the strategy
is defined to be the strategy that plays as τ on (Γ, A 1 ) and B (it will never play on other component games), where the subscripts are to distinguish different copies of A. It works essentially because we allow only copy-cat strategies in Id-games.
◮ Id-Comp. We then clearly have:
◮ Id-Subst. Furthermore, for any game ∆ ∈ PG and strategy φ : ∆ → Γ in EPG, we have:
◮ Refl-Subst. Also, the following equation holds:
Note that equality of strategies τ 1 , τ 2 : G is equivalent to an inhabitation of the Id-game Id G (τ 1 , τ 2 ). Thus, EPG induces a model of extensional variant of the type theory [Hof97] .
Game-theoretic Universes
In a completely analogous way, we now define the genearl, categorical notion of CwFs with universes, following the formulation in [Uni13] .
◮ Definition 5.6.7 (CwFs with universes). A CwF C is said to support (a hierarchy of) universes if:
◮ U-Form. For any context Γ ∈ C, there is a type
for each natural number n ∈ N. We often write U for U n with some n ∈ N.
◮ U-Intro. For any type A ∈ Ty(Γ) and natural number n ∈ N, we have:
where recall that U is U k for some k ∈ N.
◭
Finally, we present our game-theoretic interpretation of the hierarchy of universes:
◮ Lemma 5.6.8 (EPG supports universes). The CwF EPG of predicative games and generalized strategies supports universes.
Proof. Let Γ ∈ EPG be any game.
◮ U-Form. The dependent game U n ∈ Ty(Γ) is defined to be the "constant" dependent game {U n |γ : Γ}, where U n is the n th universe game, for all n ∈ N.
◮ U-Intro. Any dependent game G ∈ Ty(Γ) is clearly a strategy G : (Γ, U) by the definition. Similarly, the strategy U n : U n+1 for each n ∈ N induces the "constant" strategy U n : (Γ, U n+1 ).
) by the definition of the universe games.
Game-theoretic Interpretation of ITT
Recall that the model in EPG is an interpretation of the extensional variant of the type theory (ETT). To construct a model of the intensional variant of the type theory (ITT), we need to consider different interpretation of identity types. A reasonable idea is to relax the existence of a copy-cat strategy (as a proof of equality) to the existence of an isomorphism strategy.
17

Isomorphism Strategies as Proofs of Equalities
As we shall see, to interpret proofs of equalities by isomorphism strategies, we need to focus on strategies that preserve isomorphisms between strategies:
◮ Definition 6.1.1 (Iso-preserving strategies). A strategy τ : A ⊸ B is said to be iso-preserving if there is an isomorphism strategy τ p :
That is, the elements of an iso-preserving dependent game are not completely arbitrary but weakly unified via isomorphisms. We need this condition, since otherwise, e.g., Leibniz' law would not hold in our game semantics.
We proceed to show that isomorphisms are preserved under some operations: Proof. We only handle the cases of games; the cases of strategies are completely analogous. Let
⊸ D be isomorphism strategies. Then we have the following isomorphisms:
Note that isomorphisms are not preserved under composition. For instance, consider the constant zero strategy z : (N, Fin N ) introduced in the previous example. For any natural numbers m, n ∈ N with m = n, we have m ∼ = n but z • m ∼ = z • n. This illustrates why we have to focus on iso-preserving strategies.
Game-theoretic Category with Families for ITT
We now define another CwF of games and strategies that interprets ITT. ◮ Definition 6.2.1 (The intensional CwF IPG). The CwF IPG is defined to be almost the same as EPG except that the strategies are restricted to equiv-preserving ones. for each strategy φ : ∆ → Γ in IPG is well-defined because σ and φ are both iso-preserving. Also, derelictions are clearly iso-preserving, so the first and second projections are welldefined. Finally, by Lemma 6.1.2, the extensions are well-defined, completing the proof.
Game-theoretic Type Formers
We proceed to equip the CwF IPG with semantic type formers. First, for -and -types, the same constructions as EPG can be straightforwardly applied:
◮ Proposition 6.3.1 (IPG supports -and -types). The CwF IPG supports -and -types.
Proof. First, the constructions of and are well-defined because the iso-preserving property of dependent games is preserved by Lemma 6.1.2.
Next, we have no problem in inheriting the interpretation of -Intro and -Elim rules of EPG because λ A,B (σ) is essentially σ, and the strategy ev is essentially a dereliction.
Also, -Intro and -Elim rules can be interpreted in the same way as EPG because Pair A,B is essentially a dereliction, and the strategy R A,B,P (ψ) is essentially ψ, completing the proof.
Next, we consider intensional Id-types, in which the iso-preserving property of dependent games plays an important role.
◮ Notation. Let A, B be predicative games, and σ : A, τ : B strategies. We write σ ≫ τ for the strategy on the linear implication A ⊸ B that plays as τ up to the "tags for disjoint union". Moreover, if φ(σ 1 , . . . , σ n ) : B is a composition of strategies σ 1 : A 1 , . . . , σ n : A n and possibly some other strategies, then (σ 1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ σ n ) ⇋ φ(σ 1 , . . . , σ n ) denotes the strategy on A ⊸ B, where A df.
= A 1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ A n that plays as φ(σ 1 , . . . , σ n ) plus "copy-cat" between the two occurrences of σ i for all i = 1, . . . , n. Abusing the notation, we apply these notations for the implication A → B = !A ⊸ B as well. = A{p(A)} ∈ Ty(Γ.A).
◮ Id-Form. For each triple of a game G and strategies τ 1 , τ 2 : G, we define the intensional identity game for τ 1 and τ 2 to be the subgame Id G (τ 1 , τ 2 ) τ 1 → τ 2 whose strategies are isomorphisms τ 1 ∼ = τ 2 only. We then define the dependent game Id A ∈ Ty ( ( (Γ, A) , A + )) to be { Id A (σ 1 , σ 2 ) | (γ&σ 1 )&σ 2 : ( (Γ, A), A + )}. In other words, we define Id A ((γ&σ 1 )&σ 2 )
= Id A (σ 1 , σ 2 ). which completes the proof.
Finally, we equip IPG with the game-theoretic universes.
◮ Proposition 6.3.3 (IPG supports universes). The CwF IPG of predicative games and generalized strategies supports universes.
Proof. It is obvious that we can equip IPG with the same universes as those of EPG.
Intensionality
We now investigate how intensional the model of ITT in IPG is through some of the rules in the type theory. For a type A and terms a, a ′ : A, we write a = A a ′ or just a = a ′ for the Id-type between a, a ′ and ⊢ a ≡ a ′ : A for the judgemental equality between a, a ′ in ITT. Also for brevity, we do not notationally distinguish syntactic objects and their interpretations in IPG.
Equality Reflection
The principle of equality reflection (EqRefl), which states that if two terms are propositionally equal, then they are judgementally equal too, is the difference between ITT and ETT: Roughly, ETT is "ITT plus EqRefl".
Recall that the model in IPG refutes EqRefl, as two isomorphic strategies are not necessarily equal. Hence, it is a model of ITT, not ETT.
Function Extensionality
Next, we consider the axiom of function extensionality (FunExt), which states that for any type A, dependent type B : A → U, and terms f, g : x:A B(x), we can inhabit the type
It is not hard to see that the model in IPG refutes this axiom: By the definition, a strategy φ = &{φ σ | σ : A } :
(A, B) is not completely specified by the extensional collapse π φ : gs(A) → gs(⊎B) and a strategy on ⊎B; thus, even if x:A f (x) = g(x) holds, i.e., f (x) and g(x) are interpreted as isomorphic strategies on B for all x : A, the interpretation of f may not be isomorphic to that of g.
Uniqueness of Identity Proofs
Next, we investigate the principle of uniqueness of identity proofs (UIP), which states that for any type A, the following type can be inhabited: a1,a2:A p,q:a1=a2 p = q.
It is sound for the model in IPG by the definition of the Id-types: For any game A and strategies σ 1 , σ 2 : A, any strategies p, q : σ 1 = σ 2 are isomorphism strategies, so there must be an isomorphism strategy between them.
Criteria of Intensionality
There are Streicher's three Criteria of Intensionality: It is straightforward to see that the model in IPG validates the criteria I and II but refutes the criterion III.
Univalence
We finally analyze the univalence axiom (UA), the heart of HoTT, which states that
for all types A and B. Roughly, a term of an equivalence A ≃ B consists of functions f : A → B, g : B → A and propositional equalities p : f • g = id B , q : g • f = id A ; for the precise definition, see [Uni13] . It is then not hard to see that the model in IPG does not validate this axiom, as (A ≃ B) carries more components than (A = U B).
Conclusion
In the present paper, we have presented a new variant of games and strategies that interprets both extensional and intensional variants of intuitionistic type theory with -, -, and Id-types as well as universes (with Example 4.1.7, it is not hard to interpret natural numbers type as well).
It generalizes the existing notion of games and strategies and achieves a computational and intensional interpretation of dependent types in an intuitive manner. Remarkably, it interprets the hierarchy of universes as games for the first time in the literature. However, its interpretation of intensional Id-types does not capture phenomena in HoTT. Meanwhile, we have recognized that IPG looks quite similar to the CwF of groupoids in the historic paper [HS98] . Thus, it is a future work to refine the model by equipping it with a groupoid structure to interpret Id-types better. Also, it remains to establish a definability result; for this, we need to focus on total and effective games and strategies.
